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Abstract
We examine the investment decision problem of a group whose members have heterogeneous
time preferences. In particular, they have different discount factors for utility, possibly not
exponential. We characterize the properties of efficient allocations of resources and of shadow
prices that would decentralize such allocations. We show in particular that the term structure
of interest rates is decreasing when all members have DARA preferences. Heterogeneous
groups should not use exponential discounting for their collective investment decisions even
if all agents discount exponentially.We also exhibit conditions that lead the representative
agent to have a rate of impatience that decreases with GDP per capita.
JEL Code: D7.















Saving and investment decisions are among the most important choices of
economic agents. They strongly aﬀect the lifetime welfares of individuals
and the prosperity of nations. Such decisions reﬂect time preferences. Most
people prefer an immediate utility reward to the same reward experienced
later. This pure preference for the present, or impatience, has long been
recognized by economists and psychologists. The classical model introduced
by Samuelson (1937) takes this into account by assuming that consumers
maximize the discounted value of the ﬂow of their utility, utilizing an expo-
nentially decreasing discount factor, i.e., with a constant rate of impatience.
However, the intensity of impatience is a subject that is little understood
and intensely debated.
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) survey several attempts
to estimate individuals’ discount rates. Two noteworthy ﬁndings emerge.
First, high discount rates predominate. For example, Warner and Pleeter
(2001) study actual ﬁnancial decisions made by U.S. military servicemen, and
ﬁnd an estimated mean discount rate of 17.5% per year. Second, and more
important, there is a spectacular variation across studies and within studies
across individuals, with no convergence toward an agreed-upon or unique
rate of impatience. In their study, Warner and Pleeter (2001) found that
individual discount rates vary between 0% and 70% per year. Barsky, Juster,
Kimball and Shapiro (1997) estimated a negative mean rate of impatience by
using survey responses in the Health and Retirement Study. In the literature
more generally, rates range from −6% to 55700%.
These variations could stem in part from diﬀerences in the time horizon
considered in the various experiments and ﬁeld studies. There is no rea-
son to believe that consumers use the same discount rate per period when
discounting utility over diﬀe r e n tt i m eh o r i z o n s . S t r o t z( 1 9 5 6 )w a st h eﬁrst
economist to discuss horizon-dependent discount rates. Empirical evidence
suggests that agents discount future happiness at a rate that declines with
the time at which the happiness will be experienced. Most typically, peo-
ple use ”hyperbolic discounting”, i.e., declining discount rate with respect
to time-horizon, rather than exponential discounting. This leads to a time
inconsistency problem that emerged recently as a ”hot” topic in our profes-
2sion.1
This paper follows another path to explain the wide range of estimates
for individual discount rates. There is no reason to believe that diﬀerent
consumers have identical time preferences for utility streams. Let us assume
that sizeable disparities in discount rates arise because individuals strongly
diﬀer in their attitude towards time. Day-to-day evidence, say in pursuing
education or bad habits, is compatible with heterogeneous time preferences.
Such heterogeneity raises several questions that we explore in this paper.
When individuals use diﬀerent rates of impatience to discount their fu-
ture utility, it is not clear a priori which discount rate should be used, for
example, for public investments. This raises the more general question of the
aggregation of preferences in a group. We consider a general model where
each agent maximizes a time additive lifetime utility. The discount rate is
heterogenous in the population and it may depend upon either the time of re-
ceipt (hyperbolic discounting) or on current consumption. Agents may also
have diﬀerent instantaneous utility functions. We assume that the group
is able to allocate consumption within the group in a Pareto-eﬃcient way.
We ﬁrst show that the behaviour of the group towards time can be dupli-
cated by a representative agent whose lifetime utility functional is also time
additive. Time additivity is essential to deﬁne a concept of impatience. Ru-
binstein (1974) also examined the question of aggregating heterogenous rates
of impatience, but he derives a solution only for exponential and logarithmic
utility function in a two-period model.
One of the key ﬁndings of this paper is that if individuals have hetero-
geneous constant rates of impatience, the representative agent will not in
general use a constant rate to discount the future. More precisely, we show
that if individuals have decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), as would
seem reasonable, then the representative agent has a declining discount rate.
In short, heterogeneous individual exponential discounting yields collective
hyperbolic discounting. Under some realistic calibrations of the economy,
the collective discount factor duplicates either the one discussed by Loewen-
stein and Prelec (1992), or its simpliﬁed ”quasi-hyperbolic” version (Laibson
(1997)).
To get to this result, we need to examine how agents should share re-
sources intertemporally in an exchange economy with no investment oppor-
1See for example Laibson (1997), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Benabou and Tirole
(2000) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001).
3tunities, what might be labeled the multiple-cakes problem. Obviously, it is
Pareto-eﬃcient for the most impatient members to receive a larger share of
the period’s cake early in life; that share will be decreasing with time. This
allocation is a best compromise between individual relative impatience and
the agents’ willingness to smooth consumption over time. This trait of indi-
vidual preferences is measured by the concavity of their utility function. As
shown by Wilson (1968), it is best to use the notion of (absolute) tolerance
to consumption ﬂuctuations over time. If u(.) denotes the utility function of
an agent, her tolerance to ﬂuctuations is measured by T(.)=−u0(.)/u00(.). It
is Pareto-eﬃcient to request that more tolerant agents bear a larger share of
ﬂuctuations of aggregate incomes. Extending a well-known result by Wilson,
we show that the group’s tolerance to ﬂuctuations in the per-capita income
is the unweighted mean of its members’ tolerance.
T u r n i n gt op u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c e s ,w es h o wt h a tt h er a t eo fi m p a t i e n c e
of the representative agent equals a weighted mean of individual rates of
impatience. These weights are proportional to the individual tolerances to
consumption ﬂuctuations. Intuitively, agents with a very low tolerance want
to smooth their consumption independent of their degree of impatience. The
group will therefore not take account of these agents when determining their
collective degree of impatience. Except for exponential utility functions, the
weights in computing the weighted mean of individual discount rates will
ﬂuctuate over time. When T increases with wealth (DARA), those members
with a smaller discount rate will see their weight increasing in tandem with
time in parallel to their level of consumption. Therefore, we obtain that the
rate of impatience of the representative agent decreases with time .
The fact that the representative agent uses hyperbolic discount factors
in no way implies that the group faces a time consistency problem. Suppose
that each individual in the group discounts future utility in an exponential
way. As is well-known, such individuals will not want to modify their port-
folio of future credit/saving contracts as time moves forward. In short, the
allocation of future consumption will still be Pareto-eﬃcient tomorrow. This
future allocation will correspond to another set of Pareto weights. A time in-
consistency problem arises only if some members in the group are themselves
time inconsistent.
In the classical model of intertemporal choices, it is assumed that the rate
of impatience is independent of wealth. We show by contrast that, even if
individual rates of impatience are independent of consumption, the rate of
impatience that should be used by the social planner is generally not indepen-
4dent of the group’s per capita consumption. We provide a suﬃcient condition
that guarantees that more developed economies should use a smaller rate of
impatience.
As might be expected, the eﬃcient allocations of resources over time can
be acheived through a price mechanism. Thus we examine the characteristics
of competitive prices that decentralize such Pareto-eﬃcient allocations of re-
sources. For the intertemporal choices, they are given by the term structure
of interest rates. Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985a,b) were the ﬁrst to examine
this question using a consumption-based approach. Whether we should use
a decreasing rate to discount cash-ﬂows occurring in the far distant future
received intense debate. Signiﬁcant long-term risks, such as global warming,
are a new ingredient in the discussion, and beyond the scope of this anal-
ysis. In a risk free economy with no growth, the competitive interest rate
equals the rate of impatience of the representative agent. Thus, our results
sustain the recommendation to use a decreasing rate of interest to discount
cash-ﬂows occurring in a more distant future. The theoretical basis for this
recommendation strongly diﬀers from those developed earlier by Weitzman
(2001) and Gollier (2002a,b).
2 Assumptions on individual preferences
We consider an economy or a group of heterogeneous agents indexed by θ in
a type set Θ.2 Types are distributed according to cumulative distribution
function H : Θ → [0,1]. We assume that the lifetime utility U(θ) of consumer
θ is time-additive.3 This excludes habit formation and anticipatory feelings.





2The duration of an agent’s lifetime may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. If it is ﬁnite, u0 is uniformly
equal to zero after dead.
3Following Koopmans (1960), time additivity can be derived from the independence
axiom stating that if two intertemporal prospects share a common outcome at a given
date, then preference between them is determined solely by the remaining outcomes that
diﬀer.
5where c(.) is the consumption plan of the agent, and u(c,t,θ) is the discounted






is continuously diﬀerentiable in (c,t), and is nonincreasing in c.I f u0 is
decreasing in t, consumers are impatient, i.e., at any given consumption
level they value future marginal utility less than current marginal utility.
We hereafter redeﬁne the two well-known indexes of sensitivity of marginal
utility either with respect to t and with respect to c.










It measures the rate at which marginal utility decreases with time with con-












Impatient people have a positive δ. In the special case of a multiplicatively
separable felicity function u(c,t,θ)=β(t,θ)u(c,θ), δ is independent of c.I f
we add the assumption of exponential discounting (β(t,θ)=e x p ( −δ(θ)t)), δ
is also independent of t. In the case of hyperbolic discounting, δ is indepen-
dent of c, but is decreasing in t. In the face of the consistency problem that
a non constant δ raises, we assume at this stage that agents can commit on
their future consumption plan at date t =0 .
In a parallel way, one can deﬁne the absolute aversion to consumption








Thus A measures the rate at which marginal utility decreases with consump-
tion at a given time. In the risk context, it corresponds to the Arrow-Pratt
index of the concavity of u with respect to c. As stated by Pratt (1964), in












6Under our assumptions, A is nonnegative. Again, under the condition of a
multiplicatively separable felicity function, A would be independent of t.I f
we assume as well exponential felicity (u(c,θ)=−exp(−a(θ)c)), A would
also be independent of c. But it is usually assumed that A is decreasing in
c, i.e., DARA applies.
A and δ are two psychological traits of consumers that are essential to
understand their saving and investment behavior. Suppose that agent θ has
the opportunity to invest in various projects indexed by j ∈ J. Project j
yields a per-capita ﬂow of incomes ζj(.):R+ → R. The decision problem of






Consider in particular a marginal investment project that costs dx at time t
and that yields a beneﬁt erdtdx at time t+dt.4 Parameter r is the return of
this investment project. Assuming that the consumption path is continuously


















We say that r(c,.,θ) is the term structure of (forward) interest rates that
sustains the consumption proﬁle c(.) of agent θ. If all agents are identical, r
characterizes the competitive forward interest rates, where c(t) is consump-
tion per capita at time t. Reversing the argument, we can write that
∂c
∂t
= T(c,t,θ)[r − δ(c,t,θ)], (6)
where function T denotes the absolute tolerance to consumption ﬂuctuations,
which is the inverse of the absolute aversion to these ﬂuctuations: T(c,t,θ)=
[A(c,t,θ)]
−1 = −u0(c,t,θ)/u00(c,t,θ). We see that if r is the equilibrium risk
4Obviously, these ﬂows occur over a period of time of measure 0, with no eﬀect on U.
In reality, costs and beneﬁts are incurred during respectively period [t,t + ε] and period
[t + dt,t + dt + ε].
7free rate, an agent consuming c at time t should have a locally increasing
consumption proﬁle if δ(c,t,θ) is less than r, and vice versa. This is the
Keynes-Ramsey rule extended to non-separable felcity functions.
Condition (5) usefully extends the well-known property of optimal con-
sumption when preferences exhibit exponential discounting. It shows the
relationship between the psychological discount factor δ and the ﬁnancial
discount rate r appropriately employed to discount monetary cash ﬂows.
The shadow price of time, ρ, is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst one is δ, the
rate of impatience of the agent. The second term comes from the preference
for consumption smoothing exprssed by the concavity of u with respect to c.
When large consumption growth is expected, a large interest rate is required
to induce agents to save. Otherwise, they would want to borrow money to-
day to smooth the expected increase in their future incomes. Function A
measures the intensity of preference for consumption smoothing. For a given
growth rate of consumption, the larger is A, the larger the interest rate re-
quired to sustain this growth rate, i.e., to ﬁght the propensity to consume
immediately.
3E ﬃcient cake sharing with heterogeneous
preferences
Characterizing the optimal investment decision of a group of heterogeneous
agents requires understanding how the group will share the cash ﬂows gener-
ated by any such investment, namely how it divides the multiple cakes that
become available, one per period. Suppose that agents of type θ are endowed
with a ﬂow z(.,θ):R+ → R of the single consumption good. We assume
that endowments are risk free. An allocation is characterized by a set of
consumption proﬁles C(.,.):R+ × Θ → R,w h e r ec(t,θ) is the consumption
of agent θ at time t. Such an allocation is feasible if at each instant of time
average consumption equals average income:
EC(t,e θ)=z(t)= def Ez(t,e θ) ∀t, (7)
where Ef(e θ)=
R
Θ f(θ)dH(θ) is the mean of f(e θ) with respect to the type
distribution H.
The only restriction that we impose on the group’s sharing of the cakes
is that it be Pareto-eﬃcient. An allocation C(.,.) is Pareto-eﬃc i e n ti fi ti s
8feasible and there is no other feasible allocation that raises the lifetime utility
of at least one type without reducing the lifetime utility of the other types.
To any such eﬃcient allocation, there exists a weight function λ(.):Θ → R+











In his classic analysis of the static syndicate problem, Wilson (1968) con-
sidered a decision problem that is similar to (8). He examined a decision
under uncertainty for expected-utility (EU) maximizers with heterogeneous
utility functions, but homogeneous beliefs. Except for this restriction, the ad-
ditivity property made in the EU model under static uncertainty and in the
time-additive model (1) under dynamic certainty makes these two problems
equivalent. Wilson (1968) proved that the optimal collective decision policy
is isomorphic to the optimal decision policy of a representative agent who
also maximizes the expected value of a function of consumption per capita in
the group. The EU functional of the representative agent is additively sep-
arable with respect to the states of nature. Wilson’s result can be extended
to a dynamic framework, Constantinides (1982) has shown. The existence of
a representative agent with such simple aggregative properties has become
a cornerstone of the theories of ﬁnance and macroeconomics. In Wilson’s
model, the probability weights that are used to measure individual expected
utilities are the same for all individuals given that beliefs are homogeneous.5
The parallel assumption for intertemporal choices under certainty is that
agents use the same discounting function to measure their lifetime utility.
The following Proposition shows that the existence of a representative
agent with a time separable lifetime utility does not require any restriction
on time preference beyond the time separability of U(θ) for all θ.
Proposition 1 (Representative Agent) To any positive weight function λ(.),
there exists a representative agent with a time-additive felicity function v such
that SWF(λ)=
R ∞





λ(e θ)u(c(z,t,e θ),t,e θ)
i
s.t. Ec(z,t,e θ)=z. (9)
The associated eﬃcient allocation is characterized by C(t,θ)=c(z(t),t,θ)
for all t and θ.
5Leland (1980) reconsidered Wilson’s model when agents have heterogeneous beliefs.
9Proof: This is a direct consequence of the additivity of SWF(λ) with













λ(e θ)u(C(t,e θ),t,e θ)
i
dt.¥
By this Proposition, we decompose the multiperiod maximization pro-
gram (8) into a sequence of static maximization programs (9). By imposing
at each time t the feasible allocation of cake z(t) that maximizes the weighted
sum of instananeous felicities, the social planner obtains an ex ante allocation
plan that maximizes the weighted sum of the members’ lifetime utilities. The
time additivity of individual preference functionals is, of course, essential to
get this result.
Proposition 1 disentangles the two impacts that time has on the eﬃcient
sharing of the cake and on the felicity of the representative agent. First,
it has a direct eﬀect coming from the dependence of individual members’
felicities on time. Second, it plays a role because income per capita, z(t),
is a function of time. It is useful to separate these two eﬀects by deﬁning
C(t,θ)=c(z(t),t,θ). In the following, we examine the properties of functions
v(.,.) and c(.,.,θ).
Because of the concavity of u with respect to its ﬁrst argument, the
solution to program (9) is unique. Its ﬁrst-order condition is written as
λ(θ)u
0(c(z,t,θ),t,θ)=ψ(z,t), (10)
for all (z,t) and θ, where ψ is the Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility con-
straint associated with time t and average endowment z.B y t h e e n v e l o p e
theorem, the marginal value of wealth at time t i st h eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e r





4 The group’s tolerance to aggregate ﬂuctu-
ations
We now characterize the group’s tolerance to aggregate ﬂuctuations in earn-
i n g s .T od os o ,w en e e dt od e t e r m i n eh o wt h e s eﬂuctuations will be allocated
10among the diﬀerent agents in the group. Consider a marginal increase in
the per capita income z. At time t with average consumption z, agent θ
0s
sensitivity of consumption to such an increase is given by ∂c
∂z(z,t,θ). This is
referred to the marginal propensity to consume (MPC). It tells us how ﬂuc-
tuations in z get transferred to ﬂuctuations in individual consumption levels.




(z,t,e θ)=1 . (12)
The ﬂuctuation of average consumption must equal the ﬂuctuation of average
earnings in the group. The following Proposition characterizes the MPC.
Proposition 2 (Cake-Sharing) The marginal propensity to consume of agent
θ at time t when the average endowment is z, is proportional to this agent’s






























ET(c(z,t,e θ),t,e θ)=1 . (15)
Eliminating the ratio in (14) and (15) yields the result.¥
The cake-sharing Proposition states that more tolerant agents have larger
marginal propensities to consume. It is intuitively appealing that people who
are more tolerant to consumption ﬂuctuations should be allocated a larger
share of aggregate ﬂuctuations. By contrast, agents who strongly dislike
ﬂuctuations, i.e., those with a small T,e n j o ya ne ﬃcient consumption plan
11that is relatively insensitive to aggregate ﬂuctuations. Proposition 2 also
shows that all agents have a nonnegative marginal propensity to consume
out of aggregate incomes. All consumption levels are procyclical, but some
are more procyclical than others.
Knowing how the group allocates ﬂuctuations in aggregate earnings to
diﬀerent individuals determines the group’s attitude towards ﬂuctuations in








When the per capita endowment z(.) is increasing in t, an increase in Tv
will increase the group’s propensity to invest in a normal project, i.e., a
project that yields an increasing cash-ﬂow over time. Equation (15) yields
the following result.
Proposition 3 (Tolerance to Consumption Fluctuations) The group’s ab-
solute tolerance to consumption ﬂuctuations is the mean of its members’
tolerances:
Tv(z,t)=ET(e c,t,e θ). (17)
The group’s tolerance to ﬂuctuations of per capita earnings equals the
mean of its members’ tolerances to consumption ﬂuctuations. This observa-



















we conclude that DARA is inherited by v from u. In other words, if all
m e m b e r sh a v eat o l e r a n c et h a ti n c r e a s e si nc, then the group has a tolerance
that increases with z. This extends a result obtained by Carroll and Kimball
(1996) to the group context. Notice that v being DARA implies that the
group as a whole is ready to pay more to smooth consumption when it is
poor than when it is wealthy.
125 The group’s rate of impatience and the yield
curve
In the classic case with homogenous exponential discount factors, individuals’
consumption levels vary only with ﬂuctuations in the aggregate endowment
z(.). When discount rates are heterogenous, time enters as an additional
factor. We examine the partial derivative of individual consumption levels
with respect to time: ∂c/∂t. When the average income z remains constant
over time, it is intuitive that impatient people will trade later consumption
for earlier consumption with those who are more patient. The impatient ones
will have a decreasing consumption path, and vice versa.




(z,t,e θ)=0 . (18)
When the average income remains constant over time, increases in consump-
tion by some members of the group must be compensated by equivalent













Using (2), (3) and (10) again to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier λ,w ec a n

































13where e c = c(z,t,e θ). The next proposition characterizes the time proﬁle of
individual consumption plans when people have heterogenous discount rates.
It ﬂows from properties (19)a n d( 2 0 ) .
Proposition 4 (Individual Consumption Path) The increase in consump-
tion through time of agent θ is decreasing in the agent’s discount rate δ(θ):
∂c
∂t









This result determines when more patient people should substitute cur-
rent consumption for future consumption. In technical terms, it requires
that ∂c/∂t be increasing in δ(θ) when agents have the same tolerance to con-
sumption ﬂuctuations. The following Corollary exhibits the weaker property
of single-crossing.
Corollary 1 Suppose that agents have the same tolerance to consumption
ﬂuctuations: ∂T(c,t,θ)/∂θ ≡ 0. Then, individual consumption proﬁles sat-
isfy the single-crossing property: ∀(θ,θ












Proof: This is a direct consequence of equation (21).¥
Equation (21) is reminiscent of property (6) of individual consumption
proﬁles when the competitive interest rate is r(z,t).I n f a c t , r deﬁned by
equation (22) would deﬁne the price of time that would decentralize the
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation c(.,.,.) when there is no growth. At e r ms t r u c t u r e
of interest rates satisfying (22) would induce agents to select consumption
proﬁles that are compatible with the absence of growth. This shadow price
of time is a weighted mean of the individual discount rates. Notice that the
consumption path of agent θ increases locally in t if and only if her rate
of impatience is smaller than the market-determined shadow price of time.
More patient members postpone their consumption to the future in exchange
14for a positive return on their savings. Because both δ and r are a function
of z and t, eﬃcient consumption proﬁles need not to be monotone.
We can now turn to the central aim of this paper, which is to characterize
the aggregation of individual discount rates. Impatience comes from the fact
that, seen from t =0 , the marginal value of an increase in consumption
decreases with the time at which it takes place. One can make impatience
more explicit in the deﬁnition of the group’s preferences by deﬁning the















Combining conditions (23) and (20) yields the following result.
Proposition 5 (Collective Impatience) The instantaneous rate of pure pref-
erence for the present of the representative agent deﬁned by (23) is a weighted










Not surprisingly, the shadow price of time when there is no growth equals
the psychological discount rate of the representative agent: r(z,t)=δv(z,t).
In such an environment, a marginal investment incurring a cost at t and
yielding a beneﬁta tt + ∆t would be socially desirable if and only if its net
return would exceed δv(z(t),t). More generally, when there are aggregate
ﬂuctuations with earning proﬁle z(t), one can reinterpret equation (5) for
the representative agent to determine that such an investment is socially





Function ρ(.) characterizes the term structure of interest rates in such an
economy. The important property (25) extends classical formulas from the
literature on the term structure of interest rates6 to allow for heterogenous
6See for example Cochrane (2001) for a recent evaluation. Earlier analyses can be found
in Hansen and Singleton (1983), and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985a, 1985b).
15rates of impatience among agents in the economy. As in (5), it decomposes
the interest rate into its two components. The ﬁrst one is the group’s pure
preference for the present δv, whereas the second comes from the group’s
preference for consumption smoothing as measured by Tv. The next two
sections focus on the ﬁr s tc o m p o n e n t .T h a ti st os a yt h e ye x a m i n et h et e r m
structure of interest rates in a stationary state, when there is no economic
growth.
6 The term structure of the group’s rate of
impatience
The group’s rate of impatience can be rewritten as
δv(z,t)=b Ez,tδ(c(z,t,e θ),t,e θ),






The mean of individual rates of impatience is weighted by the corresponding
individual tolerances to consumption ﬂuctuations. This weighting of the
mean of δ is intuitive. Patient agents will be willing to save strongly early
in life only if they are suﬃciently tolerant to the consumption ﬂuctuations
they will face. To illustrate, consider a group with two agents. Agent 1 has a
high discount rate δh and is somewhat tolerant to consumption ﬂuctuations.
Agent 2, by contrast, has a lower discount rate δl, but has a zero tolerance to
consumption ﬂuctuation. Despite his patience, agent 2 will prefer to smooth
his consumption completely . Therefore, agent 1 will bear the entire burden
of aggregate ﬂuctuations. The group’s attitude towards time is therefore
determined entirely by agent 1’s preferences. In particular, the group’s degree
of impatience will be the larger δh.
As a direct consequence of the fact that δv is a weighted mean, it is




δ(c(z,t,θ),t,θ) · δv(z,t) · max
θ∈Θ
δ(c(z,t,θ),t,θ).
16It is important to notice that the weighting function T is a function of both
z and t. This is made explicit in the notation by indexing the expectation
operator b E by (z,t). Thus, even if δ is independent of z and t, it is generally
not true that δv is independent of these variables. We now examine the term
s t r u c t u r eo ft h eg r o u p ’ sr a t eo fi m p a t i e n c e .




(z,t)=2 ( b EδT
0)(b Eδ) − b Eδ
2T















where T , δ and their derivatives are evaluated at (c(z,t,e θ),t,e θ). To simplify
notation, we dropped the index to operator b Ez,t. To examine this property,
let us ﬁrst focus on the traditional model of a group whose members are ex-
ponential discounters. In this benchmark case, individual felicity functions
are multiplicatively separable: u0(c,t,θ)=β(t,θ)ν0(c,θ).T h i sm e a n st h a tδ
is independent of c, and that T is independent of t. The fact that individ-
ual members have exponential discount functions implies furthermore that
β(t,θ)=e x p ( −d(θ)t), or that δ is also independent of t.T h i si sas i t u a t i o n
where the second line in property (27) vanishes.
The problem here is to determine whether the group as a whole should use
exponential discounting when all of its members use exponential discounting.
It trivially should when all members have the same discount rate. A more
interesting case arises when individual preferences satisfy the ISHARA prop-
erty. A felicity function has an Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) if
its absolute risk tolerance is linear in consumption. Quadratic, exponential,
power and logarithmic functions are HARA. A set of felicity functions satiﬁes
the Identically Sloped HARA (ISHARA) property if its members’ absolute
risk tolerances are linear in consumption with the same slope: T0(c,θ)=1 /γ.








These utility functions are deﬁned over the consumption domain such that
γ−1( c − a(θ)) > 0.W h e nγ > 0, parameter a(θ) is often referred to as the
minimum level of subsistence. This preference set includes preferences with
17heterogeneous exponential utility functions u(c,t,θ)=−β(t,θ)exp(−A(θ)c)
when γ tends to +∞, and a(θ)/γ tends to −1/A(θ). Taking a(θ)=0for all
θ, it also includes the set of power (and logarithmic) utility functions with
the same relative concavity index γ for all θ. Under this set of conditions,











Using Jensen’s inequality, we conclude that the term structure of the social
d i s c o u n tr a t ei sd e c r e a s i n gi fT0 is a positive constant, and that it is increas-
ing when T0 is a negative constant. T0 positive is a standard assumption
in economics; it corresponds to decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
in the context of uncertainty. DARA means that agents have a tolerance
to consumption ﬂuctuations that increases with their wealth. In the next
Proposition, we show that the constancy of T0 can be relaxed at no addi-
tional cost.
Proposition 6 (Hyperbolic Collective Impatience) Suppose that agents have
multiplicatively separable felicity functions with exponential discount: u(c,t,θ)
= kν(c,θ)exp(−δ(θ)t). The term structure of the social rate of impatience
δv is decreasing (increasing) if all felicity functions v(.,θ), θ ∈ Θ, exhibit
decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion.
P r o o f :W ec o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fD A R A( T0 positive). Dividing equation


















ET(c(e θ),e θ)T0(c(e θ),e θ)
dH(θ).
Because T0 is uniformly positive, F can be interpreted as a cumulative prob-






















Obviously, combining (30) and (31) yields (29), which concludes the proof.¥
Notice that we don’t restrict T to be linear, nor assume any correlation
between rates of impatience and degrees of tolerance to ﬂuctuations. The
monotonicity of these degrees of tolerance is the only thing that matters
for the slope of the term structure of δv. Simple intuition supports this
important result. From equation (21), we know that more patient consumers
have an increasing consumption proﬁle. Under DARA, their tolerance to
consumption ﬂuctuation increases through time. This implies that when
time goes forward, consumers with a low δ see their weight growing in the
mean δv(z,t)=b Ez,tδ(e θ). This implies that the social rate of impatience
decreases with time.
Example 1 Let us illustrate this result with a simple example. There are two
groups of agents, respectively with constant rates of impatience δl and δh > δl.
All agents have the same felicity function ν(c,θ)=m i n ( b(c−a),d(c−a)),w i t h
0 <d<b . This function is piecewise linear with a kink at c = a.W ec o n s i d e r
the case where b tends to inﬁnity, which means that the left branch of the curve
becomes vertical. Parameter a is the minimum level of subsistence. On the
relevant domain [a,+∞[ of this limit function, agents have a nondecreasing
tolerance (DARA), with a zero tolerance at c = a, and an inﬁnite tolerance
for all c>a .I n t h i s e c o n o m y , a n y P a r e t o - e ﬃcient sharing of the cake
produces a ﬂip-ﬂop consumption pattern. Prior to some identiﬁed date τ,t h e
patient group functions at subsistence, and the impatient group consumes any
surplus. After time τ, the impatient group falls to subsistence, and the patient
group enjoys any surplus. As a consequence, the social rate of impatience
δv(z,t) equals δh prior to τ,a n dδl thereafter. The term structure is a simple
downward step function in this case. Rates of impatience that are decreasing
with time horizon are often refered to ”hyperbolic” discounting. Phelps and
Pollak (1968), then followed by Laibson (1997) and many others afterwards,
introduced this stepwise functional form to describe observed psychological
discount rates. This special case is often refered to the ”beta-delta” model.
Example 2 This discounting functional would emerge as the socially eﬃ-
cient rule for less extreme examples. Let us just replace the piecewise linear










Figure 1: The discount rate as a function of time horizon for two-agent group
with δh =2 0 %and δl =5 % , when ν(c,θ)=c0.9.
felicity function by a power felicity function. The two equally weighted groups
have the same constant relative risk aversion γ. Under this "fair" eﬃcient





























When γ tends to zero, this function of t can be approximated by a downward
step function with step levels at δh and δl.7 In Figure 1, we draw this function
for δh =2 0 % , δl =5 %and γ =0 .1.
Example 3 Suppose that ν(c,θ)=c1−γ/(1 − γ) and that δ(θ)=θ. Suppose
moreover that discount rates θ are distributed following a negative exponential
law e θ ∼ f(θ)=e−θ/µ/µ on Θ ≡ [0,+∞[, with a mean Ee θ = µ.W ec o n s i d e r
the Pareto-eﬃcient allocation that corresponds to the weighting function λ
7The step occurs at time horizon t =( l nδh − lnδl)/(δh − δl).
20such that λ(θ)=θ








which is independent of z. When relative risk aversion γ tends to inﬁnity, δv
tends to µ uniformly for all t.W h e nγ tends to zero, δ(z,t) tends uniformly
to η/t.I nF i g u r e2 ,w ed r a wt h em a x i m u md i s c o u n tr a t eδv as a function of
time when γ =2(relative risk aversion) and µ =5 %(mean discount rate).
As seen in (32), the socially eﬃc i e n td i s c o u n tr a t eδv declines with time t as
1/(t +
γ















This is the functional form suggested by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), who
generalized earlier proposals made by Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987).
It is useful to examine how consumption is allocated in this economy. The
set of ﬁrst-order conditions (10) combined with the feasibility constraints can























x−1e−δdδ is the Gamma function. In Figure 3, we draw the
eﬃcient consumption plan for a few types when the average earnings in the
population remain constant over time and are normalized to unity. We see
again what drives the declining term structure of δv:A tt =0 , individual con-
sumption levels and individual degrees of tolerance are positively related to the
individual rates of impatience. This weighting leads to a social rate of impa-
tience that is greater than µ. As time goes forward, most resources go to those
with low discount rates, and the social rate of impatience falls below µ. Notice
that, following condition (21) with r ≡ δv,the consumption proﬁle of agent
θ i sl o c a l l yi n c r e a s i n ga sl o n ga sδ(θ) is less than δv(z,t).B e c a u s eδv is de-
creasing in t, consumption proﬁles of all agents with a rate of impatience δ(θ)
8One conception of fairness when all agents have the same utility function would set
η =1 . This implies that the mean weight of individuals’ felicity over their (inﬁnite)
lifetime is the same for everyone:
R ∞
0 λ(θ)e−θtdt =1for all θ.








Figure 2: The social rate of impatience δv as a function of time.
less than δv(z,0) ' 7.5% are hump-shaped, whereas those agents with a rate
of impatience larger than 7.5% have decreasing consumption throughout. In
general, eﬃcient consumption proﬁles are either decreasing or hump-shaped
under the assumptions of Proposition 6.9
It follows immediately from equation (27) that one can relax the assump-
tion that members of the group use exponential discounting. If ∂δ/∂t is
nonpositive for all θ ∈ Θ, that will just reinforce the negativity of the right-
hand side of this equation.
Corollary 2 Suppose that agents have multiplicatively separable felicity func-
tions with hyperbolic discounting: u(c,t,θ)=kexp(−δ(t,θ)t)ν(c,θ) and ∂δ/∂t ·
0. The term structure of the social rate of impatience δv is decreasing if all
felicity functions v(.,θ) exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.
9The ﬁgure does not extend far enough to show the consumption for the individual
with δ =1to begin to fall. The limit case is the agent with δ =0 ; she is the only one to
have a steadily increasing consumption plan.












Figure 3: Eﬃcient consumption path for agents with diﬀerent discount rates
δ.
7A w e a l t h e ﬀect on social impatience
In the standard model of consumption, saving and growth, rates of impa-
tience are assumed to be independent of consumption levels: ∂δ/∂c ≡ 0.
However, it is often observed that wealthier economies are more patient. In
our notation, this would mean that δv is decreasing in z. In this section, we
examine whether these two assumptions can be compatible.
Observe that we found that δv is independent of z in our three examples.
This illustrates the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 If the members of the group have ISHARA preferences (28),
the social rate of impatience is independent of the consumption per capita z.











where T, δ and their derivative are evaluated at (c(z,t,e θ),t,e θ), and where
b E is the ”risk-neutral” expectation operator deﬁned by (26). For ISHARA
23preferences, δ is independent of c and T0 is a constant. It implies that the
right-hand side of the above equality is zero. The driving force behind this
result is that δ and T0 are independent for ISHARA preferences. ¥
Rubinstein (1974) obtained the same wealth irrelevancy property in the
special case of exponential and logarithmic utility functions. In the following
Proposition, by contrast, we assume that more patient people have a tol-
erance to ﬂuctuations that is more sensitive to changes in consumption. In
such a situation, the social rate of impatience will be decreasing with the
consumption per capita in the economy, despite the fact that consumers’
impatience does not depend on consumption.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the members of the group have a rate of im-
patience that is independent of their consumption: ∂δ/∂c ≡ 0. Suppose also
that their tolerance to ﬂuctuations is linear with respect to their consumption:
∂T0/∂c ≡ 0. The social rate of impatience at t will be decreasing with the
consumption level per capita if δ and T0 evaluated at t are anti-comonotone:
∀(θ,θ
0) ∈ Θ2 :[ δ(c,t,θ) − δ(c,t,θ
0)][T0(c,t,θ) − T0(c,t,θ
0)] · 0.







0 · (b Eδ)(b ET
0).
From (35), it implies that δv is decreasing in z at t.¥
A simple intuition supports this result. It comes from the fact that the
social rate of impatience is a weighted mean of individual rates of impatience.
When δ and T0 are anti-comonotone, an increase in wealth diﬀerentially in-
creases the weights associated with the lower rates of impatience. An increase
in z then pushes δv downwards.
In the special case of felicity functions exhibiting constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), viz. u0(c,t,θ)=β(t,θ)c−γ(θ), t h e r ei san e g a t i v er e l a t i o n -
ship between relative risk aversion γ(θ) and T0(c,t,θ)=1 /γ(θ). Thus, the
above Proposition applied to the case of CRRA felicity function implies that
the rate of impatience is a decreasing function of societal wealth if more pa-
tient people are also less risk-averse. The following example illustrates this
point.













Figure 4: The term struture of the social rate of impatience when u0(c,t,θl)=
e−0.05tc−1 and u0(c,t,θh)=e−0.2tc−10.
Example 4 Consider an economy with two groups of equal size. Rates of
impatience are constant, hence independent of time and consumption levels.
The ﬁrst group has low impatience rate δl and a logarithmic felicity function
(γl =1 ) . The second group has a larger rate of impatience δh > δl and a
larger constant relative risk aversion γh > 1.W e d e r i v e d n u m e r i c a l l y t h e
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation correponding to equal Pareto weights λl = λh,i n
the case of γh =1 0 , δl =0 .05 and δh =0 .20. Figure 4 shows the term
structure of the social rate of impatience when the consumption per capita
z equals 0.5,1 and 2. We see that a larger per capita consumption yields a
smaller rate of impatience for all time horizons, as proved by Proposition 8.
8 Interest rates and economic growth
We now go back to the analysis of the term structure that sustains an eﬃcient
allocation of consumption. When there are no aggregate ﬂuctuations, socially
25eﬃcient interest rates just equal the social discount rates whose structure
was examined in the previous two sections. When aggregate ﬂuctuations
prevail, the eﬃcient interest rates are characterized by equation (25).When
the economic growth rate z0/z is not zero, the second term in the right-hand
side of (25) comes into play. In this section, we examine the properties of
this consumption smoothing eﬀect.
We ﬁrst consider the direct eﬀect of time on the consumption-smoothing







for all (z,t), the previous section gives us some information on this prob-
lem. Consider for example the case where agents have ISHARA preferences.
Proposition 7 combined with property (36) tells us that Tv is independent
of t. It implies that the interest rate formula (37) is time invariant in this
case. Consider alternatively the assumptions contained in Proposition 8, in
particular the assumption that the discount rate δ and the derivative of abso-
lute risk tolerance are negatively related. Using property (36), Proposition 8
states that, under these conditions, the absolute tolerance of the representa-
tive agent is decreasing with t. When the growth of the economy is positive,
this is compatible with an upward sloping curve. Notice that this eﬀect goes
opposite to the impatience eﬀect presented in Proposition 8.
We now turn to the role of growth on the consumption smoothing term
of the interest rate. Suppose that the growth rate z0/z is constant over time.





where Rv(z,t)=z/Tv(z,t) is the relative aversion to ﬂuctuations of the
representative agent. The benchmark case has agents with identical CRRA
preferences. As is well-known, this implies that Rv(z,t) is a constant. In
the following proposition, we consider the alternative case where agents have
heterogenous CRRA preferences. In a static context with uncertainty, Hara
and Kuzmics (2002) show that this implies that the representative agent has
an Rv which is decreasing with respect to z. We now provide a shorter proof
of this important result. As shown by Gollier (2002a), it implies that the
yield curve is decreasing under the standard assumptions.
26Proposition 9 Suppose that agents have constant, identical rates of impa-
tience, and that consumption per capita is growing at a constant rate. Then
if agents have heterogenous but constant rates of relative risk aversion , the
yield curve will be nonincreasing.
Proof: Because we assume that agents have homogenous rates of im-
patience, the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (37) is independent of t.
Moreover, we know that it also implies that ∂Rv/∂t vanishes. We are done if
∂Rv/∂z is nonpositive. Diﬀerentiating Rv(z,t)=z/Tv(z,t) with respect to
z implies that this is the case if
ET(c(e θ),t,e θ) · z
ET0(c(e θ),t,e θ)T(c(e θ),t,e θ)
ET(c(e θ),t,e θ)
,









By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, this is always true.¥
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that when agents have diﬀerent rates of impatience, using
a constant rate to discount cash-ﬂow occurring at diﬀerent dates – as is
done in most cost-beneﬁt analyses – is both inappropriate and ineﬃcient.
More speciﬁcally, under the widely accepted assumption of decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion, employing a constant collective discount rate would tilt too
much toward short- as opposed to long-term investments. The recognition
of the existence of important diﬀerences in rates of impatience in the popu-
lation should induce public decision makers to focus more on the long-term
costs and beneﬁts of public actions. The eﬀect of heterogeneous time prefer-
ences should be taken seriously. In a simple calibration exercise in which we
assumed that individual discount rates are distributed in the population ac-
cording to a negative exponential law with a mean of 5% per year, we showed
that the socially eﬃcient discount rate should be around 7.5% per year for
the short term, but that it should converge to 0% for long term cash-ﬂows.
27Using the ﬁrst number would accord with government practice. Using the
second would elevate eyebrows.
We also showed that when there is a positive correlation between rates of
impatience and relative risk aversion in the population, wealthier economies
will be more patient.
28References
Barsky, R.B., F.T. Juster, M.S. Kimball and M. Shapiro, (1997),
Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity: An ex-
perimental approach in the health and retirement study, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics,5 3 7 - 7 9 .
Benabou, R., and J. Tirole, (2000), Self-conﬁdence: Intertempo-
ral strategies, Princeton University discussion paper 209.
Carrillo, J.D., and T. Mariotti, (2000), Strategic ignorance as
a self-disciplining device, Review of Economic Studies,6 7 : 3 ,
529-544.
Caroll, C.D. and M. Kimball, (1996), On the concavity of the
consumption function, Econometrica, 64, 981-92.
Cass, D. and J. Stiglitz, (1970), The structure of investor prefer-
ences and asset returns, and separability in portfolio alloca-
tion, Journal of Economic Theory,2 ,1 2 2 - 6 0 .
Cochrane, J., (2001), Asset Pricing, Princeton University Press.
Constantinides, G.M., (1982), Intertemporal asset pricing with
heterogeneous consumers and without demand aggregation,
Journal of Business, 55, 253-67.
Cox, J., J. Ingersoll and S. Ross, (1985a), A theory of the term
structure of interest rates, Econometrica, 53, 385-403.
Cox, J., J. Ingersoll and S. Ross, (1985b), An intertemporal gen-
eral equilibrium model of asset prices, Econometrica, 53, 363-
384.
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein and T. O’Donoghue, (2002), Time
discounting and time preference: A critical review, Journal of
Economic Literature, 40, 351-401.
Gollier, C., (2002a), Discounting an uncertain future, Journal of
Public Economics, 85, 149-166.
Gollier, C., (2002b), Time horizon and the discount rate, Jouranl
of Economic Theory,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Hansen, L. and K. Singleton, (1983), Stochastic consumption,
risk aversion and the temporal behavior of assets returns,
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 249-268.
29Hara, C., and C. Kuzmics, (2001), Representative consumer’s risk
aversion and eﬃcient risk-sharing rules, mimeo, Cambridge
University.
Herrnstein, R., (1981), Self-control as response strength, in Quan-
tiﬁcation of steady-state operant behavior, C.M. Bradshaw, E.
Szabadi and C.F. Lowe Eds, Elsevier/North Holland.
Koopmans, T.C., (1960), Stationary ordinal utility and impa-
tience, Econometrica 28, 287-309.
Laibson, D.I., (1997), Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 62, 443-479.
Leland, H.E., (1980), Who Should Buy Portfolio Insurance?, Jour-
nal of Finance, 35, 581-596.
Loewenstein, G., and D. Prelec, (1991), Negative time preference,
American Economic Review, 81, 347-352.
Mazur, J.E., (1987), An adjustment procedure for studying de-
layed reinforcement, in The eﬀe c to fd e l a ya n di n t e r v e n i n g
events on reinforcement value,M . L .C o m m o n s ,J . E .M a z u r ,
J.A. Nevin and H. Rachlin Eds, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
O’Donoghue, T., and M. Rabin, (2001), Choice and procrastina-
tion, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116:1, 121-160.
Phelps, E.S., and R. Pollack, (1968), On second-best national sav-
ing and game equilibrium growth, Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 35, 185-199.
Samuelson, P.A., (1937), A note on the measurement of utility,
Review of Economic Studies,4 ,1 5 5 - 1 6 1 .
Strotz, R.H., (1956), Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility
maximization, Review of Economic Studies, 23:3, 165-180.
Warner, J.T., and S. Pleeter, (2001), The personal discount rate:
Evidence from military downsizing programs, American Eco-
nomic Review, 95:4, 547-580.
Weitzman, M.L., (2001), Gamma discounting, American Eco-
nomic Review, 91, 260-271.
Wilson, R. (1968). “The theory of syndicates”, Econometrica 36,
113-132.
30CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
848  V. Bhaskar and Steinar Holden, Wage Differentiation via Subsidised General Training,
January 2003
849  Paloma Lopez-Garcia, Labour Market Performance and Start-up Costs: OECD
Evidence, January 2003
850  Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Public Policy for Start-up
Entrepreneurship with Venture Capital and Bank Finance, January 2003
851  Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan: A
Quantitative Assessment of Real and Financial Integration, January 2003
852  Gregory D. Hess, The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment,
February 2003
853  Douglas J. Cumming and Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Comparative Venture Capital
Governance. Private versus Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Funds, February 2003
854  Eckhard Janeba and John Douglas Wilson, Decentralization and International Tax
Competition, February 2003
855  Tapio Palokangas, Capital Accumulation and Employment Cycles in a Model of
Creative Destruction, February 2003
856  Brendan Walsh, When Unemployment Disappears: Ireland in the 1990s, February 2003
857  Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, A General Approach to the Stochastic Rotation
Problem with Amenity Valuation, February 2003
858  Christian Schultz, Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics, February 2003
859  Ernst Fehr and Joseph Henrich, Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the
Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism, February 2003
860  Haizhou Huang, Dalia Marin, and Chenggang Xu, Financial Crisis, Economic Recovery
and Banking Development in Former Soviet Union Economies, February 2003
861  Pedro Cardoso and Bernard M.S. van Praag, How Sustainable Are Old-age Pensions in
a Shrinking Population with Endogenous Labour Supply?, February 2003
862  Volker Meier, Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance,
February 2003
863  Edward Castronova, Theory of the Avatar, February 2003864  Robert S. Chirinko, Hans van Ees, Harry Garretsen, and Elmer Sterken, Investor
Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in
the Netherlands, February 2003
865  Bernard M.S. van Praag and Pedro Cardoso, The Mix Between Pay-as-you-go and
Funded Pensions and what Demography has to do with it, February 2003
866  Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Bernhard von Rosenbladt, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G.
Wagner, A Nation-Wide Laboratory. Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by
Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Survey, February 2003
867  Frank Heinemann, The Inflationary Impact of Wage Indexation, February 2003
868  Eytan Sheshinski, Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a
Self-Selection Model, February 2003
869  M. Hashem Pesaran, Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogenous Panels with Cross
Section Dependence, February 2003
870  Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, On the Tree-Cutting Problem under Interest Rate
and Forest Value Uncertainty, February 2003
871  Norbert Berthold and Rainer Fehn, Unemployment in Germany: Reasons and Remedies,
February 2003
872  Clemens Fuest, Bernd Huber, and Philipp Tilleßen, Tax Policy and Entrepreneurship in
the Presence of Asymmetric Information in Capital Markets, February 2003
873  Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum and Risk-Class Pricing of Annuities, February 2003
874  Willi Leibfritz, Paul O’Brien and Jean-Christophe Dumont, Effects of Immigration on
Labour Markets and Government Budgets – An Overview, February 2003
875  M. Hashem Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, How Costly is it to Ignore Breaks when
Forecasting the Direction of a Time Series?, February 2003
876  Thorvaldur Gylfason and Gylfi Zoega, Education, Social Equality and Economic
Growth: A View of the Landscape, February 2003
877  Robin Boadway and Jean-François Tremblay, Public Economics and Startup
Entrepreneurs, February 2003
878  Erkki Koskela and Roope Uusitalo, The Un-Intended Convergence: How the Finnish
Unemployment Reached the European Level, February 2003
879  Robert Fenge and Volker Meier, Pensions and Fertility Incentives, February 2003
880  Eytan Sheshinski, Note on Income Taxation and Occupational Choice, February 2003881  A B Atkinson, Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations, February
2003
882  Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka, Venture Cycles: Theory and Evidence, February
2003
883  Ralf Becker and Thomas Hellmann, The Genesis of Venture Capital  - Lessons from the
German Experience, March 2003
884  Eytan Sheshinski, Note on the Optimum Pricing of Annuities, March 2003
885  Paul De Grauwe and Magdalena Polan, Globalisation and Social Spending, March 2003
886  F. van der Ploeg, Do Social Policies Harm Employment and Growth?, March 2003
887  Mirjam van Praag, Initial Capital Constraints Hinder Entrepreneurial Venture
Performance: An empirical analysis, March 2003
888  Bernard Steunenberg, Coordinating Sectoral Policymaking: Searching for
Countervailing Mechanisms in the EU Legislative Process, March 2003
889  Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit, March 2003
890  Frederick van der Ploeg, Rolling Back the Public Sector – Differential effects on
employment, investment and growth, March 2003
891  Paul De Grauwe and Marc-Alexandre Sénégas, Monetary Policy in EMU when the
Transmission is Asymmetric and Uncertain, March 2003
892  Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad, Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm
Ownership Structure, March 2003
893  Harry Flam, Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession, March 2003
894  Mathias Hoffmann and Ronald MacDonald, A Re-examination of the Link between
Real Exchange Rates and Real Interest Rate Differentials, March 2003
895  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg, and Tor Helge Holmås, A Panel Data Study of
Physicians’ Labor Supply: The Case of Norway, March 2003
896  Dennis C. Mueller, Rights and Citizenship in the European Union, March 2003
897  Jeremy Edwards, Gains from Trade in Tax Revenue and the Efficiency Case for Trade
Taxes, March 2003
898  Rainer Fehn and Thomas Fuchs, Capital Market Institutions and Venture Capital: Do
They Affect Unemployment and Labour Demand?, March 2003
899  Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wójcik, Catching Up: The Role of Demand, Supply and
Regulated Price Effects on the Real Exchange Rates of Four Accession Countries,
March 2003900  R. Selten, M. Schreckenberg, T. Pitz, T. Chmura, and S. Kube, Experiments and
Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour, April 2003
901  Stergios Skaperdas, Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy
Cannot be Divorced from its Governance, April 2003
902  Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Antonio Garcia Pascual, What Do We Know
about Recent Exchange Rate Models? In-Sample Fit and Out-of-Sample Performance
Evaluated, April 2003
903  Mika Widgrén, Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU – Decision-Making
Procedures, April 2003
904  Phornchanok Cumperayot, Dusting off the Perception of Risk and Returns in FOREX
Markets, April 2003
905  Kai A Konrad, Inverse Campaigning, April 2003
906  Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, April 2003
907  Giuseppe Bertola and Pietro Garibaldi, The Structure and History of Italian
Unemployment, April 2003
908  Robert A.J. Dur and Otto H. Swank, Producing and Manipulating Information, April
2003
909  Christian Gollier, Collective Risk-Taking Decisions with Heterogeneous Beliefs, April
2003
910  Alexander F Wagner, Mathias Dufour, and Friedrich Schneider, Satisfaction not
Guaranteed – Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe, April
2003
911  Ngo Van Long, Raymond Riezman, and Antoine Soubeyran, Trade, Wage Gaps, and
Specific Human Capital Accumulation, April 2003
912  Andrea Goldstein, Privatization in Italy 1993-2002: Goals, Institutions, Outcomes, and
Outstanding Issues, April 2003
913  Rajshri Jayaraman and Mandar Oak, The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in
Local Development, April 2003
914  Volker Grossmann, Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in
Asymmetric Equilibrium, April 2003
915  Christian Gollier and Richard Zeckhauser, Collective Investment Decision Making with
Heterogeneous Time Preferences, April 2003